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Julia Langbein
In December 2011, the European Union (EU) 
and Ukraine completed their negotiations on an 
Association Agreement (AA), including a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). 
The DCFTA does not only foresee the reduction 
of custom tariffs but seeks to foster regulatory 
convergence through which Ukraine is expected 
to unilaterally converge its national regulatory 
practices and government arrangements to the 
EU model in a number of areas such as technical 
standards, food safety, state aid, and company law. 
Up to now, the EU did not sign the AA as a reaction 
to the deteriorating political rights and the rule of 
law, exemplified by the increasing politicization of 
Ukraine’s judiciary system during the trail against 
ex-Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko. It is in the 
hands of the Ukrainian government to change the 
domestic situation so that the AA and the DCFTA 
can be signed. However, once the DCFTA will be 
set in force, the EU is well advised not to leave 
Ukraine alone with the challenge to implement 
all its provisions. The EU needs to develop a new 
approach to ensure the successful implementation 
of the agreement and to maximize the effectiveness 
of the EU’s impact on regulatory convergence 
in Ukraine. It is necessary for the EU to flank the 
incentive of market access with capacity-building 
measures that do not predominantly target state 
authorities but also increase regulatory capacities 
of private stakeholders such as firms and business 
associations.
In the current policy debate about the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the 
EU has been repeatedly criticized for its limited 
commitment to promote greater political and 
economic development in its eastern and southern 
neighbourhood by strengthening cooperation 
with local partners in civil society, the economic 
sphere and amongst the state bureaucracy. 
So far, Ukraine’s progress with regard to the 
implementation of European standards and rules 
varies greatly across policy fields. In areas where 
convergence comes at high costs for key domestic 
stakeholders, preference for “business as usual” 
practices prevails. Further, public authorities and 
private actors like firms or associations often lack 
capacities to set, monitor and enforce European 
norms and standards. 
The EU can make use of two tools to overcome 
implementation problems resulting from weak 
domestic incentives and regulatory capacities 
in Ukraine and other neighbours. First, in the 
absence of membership conditionality, the EU 
can exert conditionality towards its neighbours at 
the policy or sectoral level. In this sense, access to 
the EU single market is the strongest incentive to 
increase support among policy makers and private 
stakeholders in the neighbourhood countries for 
regulatory convergence in trade-related policy 
fields. Second, the European Commission can 
invest in assistance such as twinning projects or 
technical assistance projects to diversify domestic 
demand for policy reforms and to increase local 
capacities for adopting and implementing EU rules. 
However, in-depth analysis of Ukraine’s 
policy reforms in areas like technical regulation, 
which concerns the setting of standards for a wide 
range of industrial products, reveals that the EU 
does not effectively use available policy tools to 
increase domestic support among and capacities 
of public and private stakeholders for regulatory 
convergence. By 2011, Ukraine has only selectively 
adopted and implemented European rules and 
standards concerning technical regulation. The 
lack of reforms in an area like technical regulation 
will undermine the free movement of goods as 
envisioned in the DCFTA. By contrast, donors 
like the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) in Ukraine employ 
available policy tools in a more efficient way to 
foster convergence with European and international 
norms concerning shareholders’ rights. As of today, 
Ukraine achieved comparatively comprehensive 
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convergence in this area, particularly with regard 
to rule adoption and the establishment of regulatory 
institutions needed to enforce shareholders’ rights. 
While the aim of the subsequent analysis is not to 
rank the degree of success of different donors on 
the basis of two case studies, the brief comparison 
unravels shortcomings in the way the EU applies 
available policy tools.
The limits of market access and state support 
In the area of technical regulation the Ukrainian 
state standardization body (DSSU) as the 
monopolistic regulator retains a vested interest 
in the status quo. This is not surprising since EU 
legislation would force that regulator to share its 
power with other public authorities and private 
certifiers. To be sure, European experts have been 
serving as legal advisors for the DSSU since 
the early 2000s. These experts certainly helped 
a minority of reformers within the authority to 
challenge its monopoly through the establishment 
of the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine 
(NAAU) in 2002 and various legislative initiatives. 
The DSSU’s leadership can yet rely on 
powerful private stakeholders, i.e. the owners of 
big plants producing heavy machinery, in its effort 
to forestall more encompassing reforms. Policy-
specific conditionality applied by the EU in the 
case of technical regulation has not altered the 
cost-benefit calculation of Ukrainian producers of 
heavy machinery. In 1993, the EU began to offer 
lower import tariffs for those Ukrainian machinery 
products that conform with European technical 
standards through the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP). However, Ukrainian producers 
fear market competition from EU firms, realizing 
that Ukrainian heavy machinery lacks competitive 
advantages on the EU market. Producers of heavy 
machinery are powerful political players owing 
to their strong representation in the Ukrainian 
parliament. In the context of Ukraine’s clientelistic 
state-business relations, these producers managed 
to block major legislative initiatives that sought 
to make Ukraine’s technical regulation more 
compliant with EU law in 2001 and 2008. They 
also prevent the drafting of much needed secondary 
legislation for laws that were adopted in 2010 and 
challenge the regulatory monopoly of the DSSU. 
Concurrently, the opening of the EU market 
sufficed to increase incentives of small and 
medium-sized producers to apply European 
standards. They produce low value added products 
such as parts and components of machinery that 
enjoy a greater competitive advantage on the EU 
market than Ukrainian heavy machinery. Further, 
the production costs for meeting European norms 
and standards for parts and components are 
considerably lower than for heavy machinery. 
Moreover, small and medium producers of parts 
and components have an interest in achieving 
regulatory convergence in technical regulation 
since they suffer most from the corrupt Ukrainian 
system of technical regulation controlled by the 
DSSU. However, these pro-reformers lack the 
resources and political power to make their claims. 
While EU technical assistance created 
opportunities for lesson-learning among parts of 
the Ukrainian standardization body DSSU, the 
EU did not launch capacity-building projects to 
empower reform-minded stakeholders among 
Ukrainian machinery producers. In addition, the 
opening of the EU market does not sufficiently 
increase incentives for producers of heavy 
machinery to invest in technological upgrading. 
As a result, parts of Ukraine’s legal framework 
conformed to EU rules and practices with many 
inconsistencies, and the required institutional 
framework for enforcing technical standards is 
only partly in place.
Getting it right
Unlike the EU, the IFC and USAID have 
actively promoted regulatory convergence in 
the field of shareholders’ rights, including the 
transparent distribution of information concerning 
shareholders’ meetings, the publication of financial 
reports or the right to sell shares in case of 
mismanagement. The protection of shareholders’ 
rights has been and remains to be an important 
requirement in order to get listed on European and 
international stock exchanges. Yet, the presence of 
rewards in the form of market access did not foster 
immediate support for convergence with European 
and international shareholders’ rights among all 
Ukrainian stakeholders. 
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During the 1990s, the privatization of state-
owned assets dominated large portions of Ukraine’s 
political and economic life. Back then, the benefits 
of maintaining messy ownership structures and 
weak protection of shareholders outweighed 
the reward of market access for most Ukrainian 
businessmen who were primarily interested in 
acquiring assets rather than capitalizing on them 
at international stock exchanges. Only Ukrainian 
brokers and dealers had an interest in improving 
the image of the market in order to attract more 
capitalization amongst Ukrainian companies as 
well as foreign investment. During the 1990s, 
these potential reformers were however without 
any strong political representation to make their 
voice heard. 
Assistance provided by USAID and the IFC 
gradually empowered reformers and diversified 
domestic demand for convergence towards 
international and European rules and norms in 
the field of shareholders’ rights. By helping to 
establish the Persha Fondova Torghova Systema 
(PFTS) association in 1996, a self-regulatory 
organization for security traders in Ukraine, the 
donors helped to improve the organization of pro-
reform forces. That same year, USAID provided 
the PFTS Association with technical assistance 
to create the PFTS trading system, which was the 
first market-owned stock exchange in Ukraine. 
The donors also helped to establish the Ukrainian 
Securities Commission as early as 1996 to install 
a regulatory authority that would adopt, monitor 
and enforce shareholders’ rights. 
Once the distribution of property rights in 
Ukraine ceased by the early 2000s, Ukrainian 
firms, including big business groups that were 
strongly represented in the Ukrainian parliament, 
became increasingly susceptible to policy-specific 
conditionality as they wanted to capitalize their 
assets on European and international financial 
markets. The IFC reacted to this growing demand 
by setting up various programs to teach Ukrainian 
firms about the protection of shareholders’ 
rights as an important condition for accessing 
foreign financial markets. Furthermore, with the 
support of the IFC and USAID, the PFTS and the 
Securities Commission used the growing support 
among Ukrainian businesses to generate a JSC 
Law that was compliant with EU legislation. 
The pro-reform coalition of private and public 
regulators, which was created and empowered 
by the IFC and USAID in the mid-1990s, 
thus anchored increasing market pressures by 
Ukrainian companies to enter Western capital 
markets. 
Recommendations: A new approach for the 
DCFTA
Insights from the dynamics driving policy reforms 
in Ukraine’s technical standards and shareholders’ 
rights show that the European Commission should 
reconsider its approach to support Ukraine with 
the implementation of DCFTA provisions, and 
should take the following considerations on board: 
• Promote regulatory convergence by flanking 
economic incentives, i.e. access to the EU 
Single Market, with capacity-building 
measures for those state authorities and private 
stakeholders (e.g. firms and sectoral business 
associations) whose support is required for the 
adoption and implementation of EU rules in a 
particular policy field/sector.
• Identify those state authorities and private 
stakeholders whose support is needed for the 
adoption and implementation of EU rules in a 
particular policy field/sector before planning 
assistance projects.
• Analyze the cost-benefit analysis of those 
public and private stakeholders who are 
affected by regulatory convergence in a 
particular policy field/sector and develop tailor-
made assistance projects that help increase the 
incentives and capacities of these actors. 
• Encourage the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
or other donors to introduce a credit program 
for the upgrading of Ukraine’s production 
plants and to tie credits to convergence with 
European standards.
• Provide support for the founding of business 
associations representing those producers for 
whom convergence is beneficial. 
